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RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION OF LEGAL INTERESTS
IN MICHIGAN PROPERTY: III*

William F. Fratchert
VIL

RESTRAINTS ON INTERESTS IN CHATTELS PERSONAL

Sir Edward Coke, in commenting on section 360 of Littleton's
T enures,4° 1 said,
"if a man be possessed of a lease for years, or of a horse, or.
of any other chattell reall or personall, and give or sell his whole
interest or propertie therein upon condition that the donee or
vendee shall not alien the same, the same is void, because his
whole interest and propertie is out of him, so as he hath no possibilitie of reverter, and it is against trade and traffique, and bargaining
and contracting between man and man...."402
The precise meaning of the Lord Chief Justice is not as clear as
might be desired but the passage probably asserts two reasons for the
invalidity of a condition subsequent, providing for forfeiture on alienation, incident to a transfer of a chattel: (I) that a legal interest analogous to a possibility of reverter or right of entry on breach of condition
subsequent cannot exist in a chattel personal, and (2) that such a
condition is in illegal restraint of trade.
The first asserted reason involves the problem of the possibility of
creating legal interests in expectancy in chattels personal. As Professor
Maitland remarked, the law of personal property is "backward and
meagre."403 By comparison to the land law, the law of chattels personal is relatively undeveloped and such full development as there is
is fragmentary and disconnected. The reasons are largely historical.
In the centuries when the doctrine of estates in land was being developed and defined, the common chattels, animals, foodstuffs and clothing, were not of a nature to encourage attempts to create complex and
divided titles. The Mediaeval Church's prohibition of interest prevented
extensive security transactions. The tremendous current investment of
wealth in bonds, corporate stock and life insurance policies, which we
* Parts I and II appeared in 50 Mich. L. Rev. 675 and 793 respectively.-Ed.
t Member, Michigan Bar; Professor of Law, University of Missouri.-Ed.
Note ll0 supra, 50 MICH. L. REv. 675 at 702 (1952).
I lNSnTUTEs 223a.
2 Pouocx: AND M.un:.AND, HisTORY oF ENGLISH LAw
EnwARD I, 181 (1895).
401
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look upon as property for some purposes, is wholly a modem development. Moreover, whereas the law of land was developed and unified
by a single tribunal, the Court of Common Pleas, the law of chattels
was created by numerous courts with divergent systems of jurisprudence
and varying concepts of policy. The ecclesiastical courts of the English dioceses handled probate of wills and administration of estates according to rules of canon law which varied with the customs of the
several sees. Their jurisdiction was of doubtful extent, interfered with
by the jealousy of the common law courts, and eventually absorbed in
large part by the High Court of Chancery. The courts of common law
provided most of the protection of chattels against crime and tort but the
High Court of Admiralty, administering a system based on the Roman
civil law, had a part in developing the law of ships and other marine
property. Until its competing courts, administering divergent systems
of law, were consolidated in the nineteenth century, England was in no
position to develop a complete and unified law of personal property
which could stand beside the elaborate scheme of the land law. 404
The law of chattels developed by the common law courts has two
striking omissions. First, it contains no concept of ownership of chattels
like that of ownership of land. It is, rather, a law of rights to possession
of chattels and injuries to such rights. The only common law actions
for specific recovery of chattels, replevin and detinue, could be converted into actions for money damages at the will of the defendant. 40 c,
The owner of a freehold interest in land had remedies at law, the real
actions and, later, ejectment, by which he could secure the land itself.
As has been seen, the owner of a chattel real acquired a like remedy. 406
The "owner" of chattels personal never did. So far as the common law
courts are concerned, his only right was to bring an action for money
damages for wrongful taking or detention. 407
Second, the law of chattels has no doctrine of estates, of ownership
divided into temporal segments. At the beginning of the thirteenth
404 3 HoLDSWORTH, HISTORY OP ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., 351-360, 534-595 (1923); 7
id. 447-515 (1926).
405 Anonymous R.S.Y.B. 14, 15, Ed. III, 30 (1340); Anonymous, Y.B. 1 Hen. V,
Hil., pl. 4 (1413); Peters v. Heyward, Cro. Jae. 682, 79 Eng. Rep. 591 (1624).
406 Snane v. Rumenal, Bract. N.B., pl. 1140 (1235); Anonymous, Y.B. 7 Ed. IV,
Pasch., pl. 16 (1468); Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Ed. IV, Mich., pl. 2 (1482).
407 3 HoLDSWORTH, HrsTORY OP ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 322 (1923); 7 id., 455-456
(1926). Equity will, under some circumstances, compel delivery of unique chattels. Pusey
v. Pusey, 1 Vern. 273, 23 Eng. Rep. 465 (1684); Duke of Somerset v. Cookson, 3 P. Wms.
390, 24 Eng. Rep. 1114 (1735); Fells v. Read, 3 Ves. Jr. 70, 30 Eng. Rep. 899 (1796).
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century the common law was consistent in requiring, as to both land
and chattels, a delivery of possession to effectuate a transfer of a proprietary interest.408 During that century the requirement was modified as
to land by the recognition of the remainder. A single livery of seisin to
A could be made to pass a life estate to A and a remainder in fee, a
present proprietary right to future possession, to B.409 The enactment
in 1535 of the Statute of Uses, 410 which converted the Chancery-developed uses into legal estates, made it possible to create legal future
interests, by way of springing and shifting use, without any livery of
seisin.411 Neither modification was extended to chattels. The common law courts would not permit delivery of a chattel personal to A
to operate to create a limited interest in A and a future interest in B;
it passed the whole title to A. 412 The Statute of Uses applied only to
interests in land, so interests in chattels created by way of use remained
purely equitable, without recognition or means of enforcement by the
common law courts. 413 The only temporally divided ownership in chattels recognized at common law was the bailment. The bailor has a
proprietary interest in expectancy analogous to a reversion expectant
upon an estate at will or for years in land. Unlike the lessor, however,
he has no effective common law ~eans of compelling the bailee to
return the goods at the expiration of the term. 414 Probably because of
this lack of a specific remedy, the law of bailni.ent has developed along
contract, as distinguished from property, lines. Apart from the quasireversionary interest of the bailor, English law to this day does not permit the creation inter vivos of a legal property interest in expectancy
in chattels personal.4115
The local canon law administered by' the ecclesiastical courts, to
whose judgments the courts of common law gave grudging recognition,
408 3 HoLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 354 (1923).
40 9 2 POLLOCK AND MAln.AND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORl! THE TIME OF
EDWARD I, 25 (1895).
410 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10 (1535).
411 7 HoLDswoRTH, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAw 83 (1926).
412 Anonymous, BRooK's NEW CASES 60, 73 Eng. Rep. 874 (1509-1546).
413 BAcoN, READING UPON THE STATOTB OF UsEs 43 (1804).
414 Notes 405, 407, supra.
415 7 HoLDSwoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 470-471 (1926); GoonEVB, MoDERN
LAw OF PERSONAL PnoPBRTY, 8th ed., 10-11 (1937); WILLIAMS, PRINCIPLES oF THE
LAw OF PERSONAL PROPERTY, 18th ed., 48, 438 (1926); Oliver, ''Interests for Life and
Quasi-Remainders in Chattels Personal," 24 L.Q. RBv. 431-439 (1908). Professor Gray
thought that chattels personal could be transferred subject to a condition subsequent but
he cited no authority for the proposition. RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., §78 (1915).
Accord with GRAY: PERKINs, PRoFITAllLB BooKB §712 (1642).
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permitted the transmission of chattels personal by will. Until the late
seventeenth century testamentary power of disposition of personalty
by will was, however, much restricted by local custom, a married man
usually having such power over only a third of his goods. 416 Unlike a
devise of land under the sixteenth century Statute of Wills,417 a bequest
of chattels was not a direct transfer of legal title to the legatee. Legal
title to all personal property of the deceased passed to his executor418
and the only right of a legatee was to have the ecclesiastical court compel the executor to carry out the provisions of the will. Except for the
fact that he was controlled by the ordinary of the diocese rather than
the High Court of Chancery, the executor was, for all essential purposes, a trustee, holding legal title subject to duties owed to creditors
and legatees.419
Even by will it was not possible to make a temporal division in the
legal title to chattels personal. They could not be bequeathed to A
for life, remainder to B. When the executor transferred them to A, A
took the whole title. 420 In the fifteenth cenuiry, however, a method of
creating future interests in chattels by will was developed. Chattels
could be bequeathed to the executor, with directions to permit A to use
and occupy them for life, then to transfer them to B. 421 In later centuries, when most of the enforcement and interpretation of wills shifted
416 3 HoLDSWORTH, HrsTORY oP ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 550-563 (1923).
417 32 Hen. Vill, c. 1 (1540).
418Anonymous, Y.B. 14 Hen. IV, Hil., pl. 37 (1412); Anonymous, Y.B. 2 Ed. IV,
Mich., pl. 1 (1462).
419 3 HoLDSWORTH, H1sTORY OP ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 519-595 (1923). By the seventeenth century the High Court of Chancery had assumed concurrent jurisdiction with the
ecclesiastical courts to compel executors to carry out legacies, acting on the theory that an
executor was a trustee, liable to account in equity as such. Cliffe v. Cliffe, MoNRo, AcrrA
CANcELLARIAB 425 (1575); Browne v. Purton, Tothill 86, 21 Eng. Rep. 131 (1589);
Yelverton v. Newport, Tothill 129, 21 Eng. Rep. 144 (1593); Bloomer's Case, Cacy.27,
21 Eng. Rep. 15 (1604); Wickham v. Dighton, MoNRo, AcrrA CANcELLARIAB 109 (1607);
Earl of Pembroke v. Zouch, Tothill 130, 21 Eng. Rep. 145 (1631); GoPPIN, THE TESTA•
MENTARY EXECUTOR IN ENGLAND .AND ELSEWHERE 74 (1901).
420 Note 412 supra; Anonymous, March 106, pl. 183, 82 Eng. Rep. 432 (1641).
421Anonymous, 37 Hen. VI, Trin., pl. 11 (1459); Fitz-James's Case, Owen 33, 74
Eng. Rep. 879 (1565); note 412 supra. See Welcden v. Elkington, 2 Plowd. 516, 75 Eng.
Rep. 763 (1578); Paramour v. Yardley, 2 Plowd. 539, 75 Eng. Rep. 794 (1578). The
trust being a much more satisfactory device for creating future interests in chattels, the law
of legal future interests in chattels was never developed fully in England and there is much
doubt as to their incidents and theoretical basis. GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETaITIEs, 3d
ed., §§77-86, 789-856 (1915); 7 HoLDswoRTH, HrsTORY oP ENGLISH LAw 471-478
(1926); Bordwell, "Interests in Chattels Real and Personal," 1 Mo. L. REv. 119, 127-132,
137-141 (1936); Oliver, "Interests for Life and Quasi-Remainders in Chattels Personal,"
24 L.Q. REv. 431-439 (1908); Simes, "Future Interests in Chattels Personal," 39 YALE
L.J. 771-803 (1930).
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to the High Court of Chancery, wills purporting to create legal future
interests in chattels tended to be construed as bequests of use and occupation, thus permitting their enforcement.422
It appears, therefore, that Sir Edward Coke's fast reason423 suggests
one major difference between the law of restraints on alienation of land
and that of restraints on alienation of chattels, namely, that the limited
possibilities of creating interests in expectancy in chattels greatly restrict the available devices for imposing restraints. His second reason424
suggests another major difference. Land was not looked upon as an
article of commerce in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and that
remained so, as to estates of inheritance, throughout the mediaeval
period. Hence the law of restraints on alienation of estates in fee
simple and fee tail, developed during that period, is a law governing
donative and testamentary transactions. In the later Middle Ages leasehold interests did become articles of commerce and, as has been seen, a
different set of rules developed as to them. The mediaeval reason for
restraining alienation of estates in fee was to keep land in the family.
This type of restraint was not permitted. The mediaeval reason for
restraining alienation of leasehold interests was to protect reversioners
and remaindermen against waste. This type of restraint, imposed
largely for commercial reasons, was permitted. In modern times land
has become an article of commerce and a new reason for restraining
alienation of estates in fee, to protect the character of a neighborhood,
has appeared. But the law as to restraints on estates of inheritance had
become too well settled for change and the old rules, developed when
land was not a commercial commodity, were applied to a new situation.
Chattels, on the other hand, have always been articles of commerce and
rules governing restraints on their alienation did not become £.xed during the mediaeval period. The mediaeval rules governing donative and
testamentary dispositions of land may be followed as to like dispositions
of chattels but we cannot be certain that they are applicable to commercial transactions involving chattels. Certainly there are substantial
differences in the considerations of policy which affect the two types of
transactions.
A third major difference between the law of restraints on alienation
of land and that of restraints on alienation of chattels should be noted.
422 Catchmay v. Nicholas, Rep. temp. Finch 116, 23 Eng. Rep. 63 (1673). Other
cases are collected in GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PllRPETUlTIJlS §85n (1915).
423 Note 402 supra.
424Ihid.
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The law as to land developed fully centuries ago; that as to chattels is
relatively modern, incomplete and rapidly developing. The rules as to
land were developed in connection with the doctrine of estates and
became fu:ed in the mediaeval period, when status was dominant. Indeed, the very word "estate" is a variant of "status."426 English law
knows no estates in chattels and the rules governing restraints on their
alienation, so far as there are any, were developed in an era when the
concept of contract was dominant; when courts were impatient with
the fixed and arbitrary rules of the mediaeval common law and anxious
to enforce the intention of parties to contracts so long as they did not
contravene current concepts of public policy. The era of laissez faire
has waned. We have entered upon a new era of status, of fixed and
arbitrary rules imposed by government £at. It seems probable that
the law of restraints on alienation of chattels will complete its development in a setting of strict government regulation of property, business
and human relationships. Already legislative and administrative restrictions have an important place in the field. Very likely there will be
rules eventually as to restraints on alienation of chattels as complete,
precise and strict as those which relate to land. We cannot predict
their exact nature but we can be reasonably sure that, insofar as commercial transactions are concerned, they will not be the same rules
which the judges of the Plantagenet period developed as to restraints on
alienation of land.

A. Donative and Testamentary Transactions

In England the impossibility of inter vivos creation of interests in
expectancy in chattels and the unsuitability for the purpose of the devices of bailment and contract have tended to restrict attempts to restrain
the alienation of chattels to the trust device and provisions in wills for
forfeiture on alienation. The trust device involves equitable interests,
which are beyond the scope of this study. In connection with a bequest
of the use and occupation of chattels fQr life or a term of years the
PoLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY oF ENGLISH I.Aw BEFORE THE T1ME oF EDI, 11 (1895); TaRNER, THE EQUITY oF RimEMPTION 1-3 (1931). It should be
borne in mind, too, that the legislative declaiation [stat. Quia Emptores Terrarum, 18 Edw.
I, stat. 1, c. 1 (1290)] that estates in fee simple were alienable and the judicial declaration
[Taltarum's Case, Y.B. 12 Edw. IV, Mich., pl. 25 (1472), note 67 supra] that entails were
barrable were the results of socio-economic conHicts in which powerful interests were opposed to alienability. The geneial alienability of chattels has never been questioned or
opposed and there has never been a problem of preventing potent economic forces from
making chattels geneially inalienable.
425

WAIID
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English courts would probably sustain the validity of a provision for
forfeiture on alienation by way of executory bequest to another. 426 They
have held such a provision void when attached to a bequest of the
general property in chattels. 427 As to testamentary restraints, then, the
English law of chattels appears to follow that of land.
Probably because of misinterpretation of a passage in Blackstone's
Commentaries,4 28 most American courts have tended to assume that
interests in expectancy in chattels, of the types permissible in land, can
be created by deed as well as by will. 429 There is substantial authority
in this country for the validity of legal interests in non-consumable
chattels which correspond to the reversion, the remainder, the shifting
use, and the shifting executory devise in land. 430 It has been suggested
that interests analogous to the possibility of reverter and the right of
entry on breach of condition subsequent are possible. 431 In the setting
of this development the American writers have maintained, and such
decisions as there are tend to confirm, the view that the rules governing
the validity of prohibitions and provisions for forfeiture on alienation
of legal interests in chattels are the same as those which apply to similar
restraints on alienation of estates in land of like duration. 432 For this
426 This is the rule as to life interests in chattels bequeathed in trust. The cases are
collected in GRAY, REsTRAINTs ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., §78 (1895). In England the rules
governing restraints on alienation of equitable interests tend to follow those which apply
to equivalent legal interests.
427 Bradley v. Peixoto, 3 Ves. Jr. 324, 30 Eng. Rep. 1034 (1797); Rishton v. Cobb,
5 Myl. & Cr. 145, 41 Eng. Rep. 326 (1839). In Powell v. Boggis, 35 Beav. 535, 55 Eng.
Rep. 1004 (1866) there was a bequest of corporate stock to a sister for life, then to be
sold by the executors and the proceeds divided among nephews and nieces. A provision
of the will that the legacy of any nephew or niece should be forfeited if he aliened his
interest before distribution was held to be a void restraint on alienation.
428 "If a man either by deed or will limits his books or furniture to A for life, with
remainder over to B, this remainder is good." 2 CoMMENTARIES *398; see 7 HOLDSWORTH,
H1sTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 471 (1926). Professor Bordwell has suggested that Blackstone
probably had a deed of trust in mind. "Interests in Chattels Real and Personal," l Mo. L.
REv. 119 at 141 (1936).
420 GRAY, RuLB AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., §§88-98 (1915); Bordwell, "Interests
in Chattels Real and Personal," l Mo. L. REv. 119 at 141-144 (1936); Simes, "Future
Interests in Chattels Personal," 39 YALE L.J. 771-803 (1930).
430 The cases are collected in Simes, "Future Interests in Chattels Personal," 39 YALB
L.J. 771 at 783-785 (1930). The validity of future interests in personalty corresponding
to remainders, created by will, was recognized in Glover v. Reid, 80 Mich. 228, 45 N.W.
91 (1890); Sellick v. Sellick, 207 Mich. 194, 173 N.W. 609 (1919), and Hankey v.
French, 281 Mich. 454, 275 N.W. 206 (1937).
431 Simes, "Future Interests in Chattels Personal," 39 YALE L.J. 771 at 785-787
(1930); 2 ScHOULER, TREATISE ON THE LAw OF PERSONAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §309
(1896); see GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §78. See Gamble v. Gates, 92 Mich. 510,
52 N.W. 941 (1892).
432 GRAY, REsTRAINTs ON THE ALIENATION OF PRoPERTY, 2d ed., §§27, 28, 78, 105,
134 (1895); 2 Sn,ms, FUTURE INTERESTS §§446, 447, 456, 457, 463, 465 (1936). The
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purpose the general property in a chattel is assimilated to an estate in fee
simple in land, a treatment suggested by the passage from Coke quoted
at the beginning of this section.433

State v. Dunbar Estate434 was a claim against the guardian of a
lunatic for the cost of the ward's care in an asylum. The only assets
in the hands of the guardian were funds bequeathed to the ward by a
will which provided,
"I direct that income and principal also shall be received by all
beneficiaries free and clear of their debts, contracts, anticipations,
and alienations, and of all liability for or by reason of the same, and
from all levies, attachments and executions. Payments must be
made either directly to the beneficiaries, or upon their respective
orders, signed not more than three months beforehand."
A judgment allowing the claim was affirmed, the court saying, "We
do not think the language open to the construction that, after the fund
had in fact come into the hands of the legatee, it should not be liable
for his subsequent enga.gements."435

Abrey v. Duffe,eld436 was a suit to construe a will, a codicil to which
provided that, "my son Thomas is to have the use and possession of [a
piano] during his life, but that the same is not to be disposed of by him."
The validity of this restraint on alienation was not decided or discussed.
Turnbull v. Johnson431 was a suit to rescind for fraud a sale of corporate stock. The stock, with other property, had been bequeathed to the
testator's widow, "to be hers absolutely during her lifetime, and at her
death what of the same might be left to my two sons, . . . share and
share alike, and their heirs forever." The widow, the sons and a bank
to which the stock had been pledged assigned the stock to the defendant.
The sons brought suit, claiming that their joinder in the assignment
had been procured by fraud. A decree for the defendant was affirmed
I

articles of Professor Schnebly ["Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests," 44
YALE L.J. 961-995, 1186-1215, 1380-1408 (1935)] and Mr. Manning ["The Development
of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray," 48 HARv. L. REv. 376-406 (1935)] do not discuss
the law of chattels personal. The RESTATEMENT OP PROPERTY does not discuss restraints
on alienation of chattels personal, saying, "The problems thereby raised and the considerations which enter into their solution are to such an extent different, in a state of flux and
subjected to statutory provisions, that it is undesirable to treat them.•••" Div. IV, Part
II, Introductory Note.
Note 402 supra.
99 Mich. 99, 57 N.W. 1103 (1894).
99 Mich. 104-105, 57 N.W. 1104.
436149 Mich. 248, 112 N.W. 936 (1907).
437 153 Mich. 228, 116 N.W. 1009 (1908).
433
434
435
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on the general ground that the will operated to place the entire title to
the stock in the widow, so that the sons had no interest in it. The court
cited Jones v. Jones438 and some of the line of cases following it which
hold, in effect, that a gift over on failure of the £.rst taker to alienate
inter vivos is repugnant to a grant or devise in fee simple because it is
a restraint on testation and intestate descent. 439 The decision in Turnbull v. Johnson follows what is probably the general rule in this country,
that an executory bequest over on failure of a legatee of the entire title
to personalty to alienate inter vivas is void as a restraint on testation
and intestate distribution. 440
'

W essborg v. Merrill441 was an appeal from a probate order of distribution. The testator bequeathed corporate stock to three trustees to
pay the income to his wife and £.ve children "and to their respective
heirs, share and share alike," until August 11, 1914. The will provided,
"After August 11, 1914, the stock shall be equally divided
among them ... , and each may dispose of his or her own stock at
will, under this condition, however, that the stock shall be sold to
one of their own number, to keep it in the family, providing the
price obtained is as good as any outsider will give."
One of the daughters died in 1913, bequeathing her estate to the
respondent in trust. The probate order, which distributed a child's
share in the stock to the respondent, was affirmed without comment on
the validity of the restraint on alienation. Inasmuch as the respondent
was not one of the children, the effect of the decision was to hold the
restraint inoperative as to a disposition by will. The restraint was, in
effect, a pre-emptive option which, in the case of land, would seem to
be valid under Michigan law despite the fact that it was perpetual and
:;o, under the law of most jurisdictions, in violation of the Rule Against
Perpetuities.442

Hankey v. French443 was a suit to construe a will. Testator bequeathed to his wife,
"the use and income of my share or interest in the business of R. T.
French & Sons, wheresoever conducted, provided, however, that
438 25 Mich. 401 (1872), note 180 supra.
439 Note 182 supra. Glover v. Reid, 80 Mich. 228, 45 N.W. 91 (1890), which involved personalty, held such a gift over valid where the first taker was given only a life
interest with a limited power of disposition inter vivos.
440-GRAY, R:esTRAINTs ON THE AI.mNATION OF PROPERTY, 2d ed., §56a; cf. §65
(1895). Annotation, 17 A.L.R. (2d) 7-227 (1951).
· 441195 Mich. 556, 162 N.W. 102 (1917).
, 442 Windiate v. Leland, 246 Mich. 659, 225 N.W. ·620 (1929); notes 230, 231 supra.
443 281 Mich. 454, 275 N.W. 206 (1937).
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my interest in said business is not to be sold or disposed of, but
that the business is to be continued and that my share of the profits
arising from the conduct of said business is to be paid to my wife,
... so long as she shall remain my widow.
"Paragraph 3.· I give, devise and bequeath to my children,
... in equal shares, my interest in the partnership of R. T. French
& Sons, after the death of my wife, ... or in the event of her remarriage, and I do further especially direct that my interest in the
partnership of R. T. French & Sons shall not be sold or disposed
of during the minority of either of my said sons."
The circuit court held that the interest in the partnership, which
owned land, was personalty, that the restraints on alienation imposed by
the second and third paragraphs of the will were void, 444 and that the
bequest was adeemed by a change in the partnership structure which
occurred between the date of the will and the death of the testator.
There was no appeal from the first two conclusions. The decree was
reversed and a decree ordered in "accordance with the quoted language
of the will," the Supreme Court holding that there had been no
ademption. The opinion does not discuss the validity of either restraint
on alienation but, in view of the nature of a chancery appeal, the decision is probably some authority for the proposition that a prohibition on
alienation in a bequest of personalty is void, both as to a life interest
and as to a succeeding interest in the nature of a remainder in fee.
The authorities are scanty but, such as they are, they indicate that,
in donative and testamentary transactions, Michigan tends to apply to
restraints on alienation of interests in chattels personal the rules which
govern the validity of similar restraints on estates in land of like duration. If so, it may be assumed that all prohibitory restraints, those which
would compel the owner of a legal interest in a chattel to remain owner
in spite of his attempt to transfer it, are void. Penalty restraints by
way of forfeiture on alienation are void if attached to a gift or bequest
of the otherwise absolute general property in chattels. Penalty restraints on a bequest of an interest in chattels for life or years, by way of
a provision for an executory bequest to another in the event of alienation, are probably valid. A provision in a gratuitous bailment for life
or a term of years that the bailor may treat the bailment as terminated
444 The Supreme Court opinion indicates that the decree below held only the restraint
imposed by paragraph 3 void. 281 Mich. 454 at 459. The actual decree of the circuit
court, however, determined that the restraints imposed by paragraphs 2 and 3 were both
void. Record, p. 29.
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and retake possession if the bailee transfers his interest to another is
almost certainly valid. 445 Whether a provision in a gratuitous bailment
for forfeiture on alienation to someone other than the bailor would be
valid is highly doubtful, in view of the lack of authority for the creation
of future interests in chattels by transactions inter vivos.

B. Commercial Transactions
The interest of a bailee of chattels under a pawn or under that type
of hiring known in the Roman law as locatio rei446 corresponds to the
interest of a lessee of land for life or years. In the thirteenth century
the lease of land was commonly given as security for money lent, thus
serving the same purpose as the pawn. 447 The similarity between a demise of land to be used for commercial operations of the lessee and the
demise of a ship for like use is evident. At the beginning of that century the interests of the lessee of land and the bailee of chattels were
treated much alike, primarily as personal contract rights against the
lessor or bailor rather than as interests in property in rem. 448 Although
estates for years in land remained personal property, the development
of remedies for their specific enforcement and their use in donative and
testamentary transactions tended toward their treatment more as property than as personal contract rights. The bailment, on the other hand,
has remained a topic of the law of contract and tort, more an aspect
of commercial law than of that of property. Hence, whereas the interest of the lessee for life or years is prima facie alienable,449 the interest of the bailee is treated as personal to himself and inalienable in most
cases, even when his interest is not terminable at the will of the bailor.450
The general rule that the interest of a bailee is inalienable has
some exceptions. The pawnee may transfer his interest in the pawn
with an assignment of the debt. 451 Although the English view is that
the interest of a bailee who has a common law artisan's lien is inalienable,452 some American states, including Michigan, permit such a bailee
445 See Bringloe v.

Morrice, 1 Mod. 210, 86 Eng. Rep. 834 (1675).
For the classification of bailments see Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng.
Rep. 107 (1703); STORY, LAw OF BAILMENTS, 9th ed., §§3-9 (1878).
447 3 HoLDswoRTH, HrsToRY oF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 215 (1923).
448 Id. at 213, 336-351.
449 Notes 236, 291, 292 supra.
450 STORY, BAILMENTS §234; 1 WILLISTON, SAI.Es OF GooDs, 2d ed., 332 (1924).
451 Mores v. Conham, Owen 123, 74 Eng. Rep. 946 (1609); Donald v. Suckling, L.R.
1 Q.B. 585 (1866); Drake v. Cloonan, 99 Mich. 121, 57 N.W. 1098 (1894); other
American cases are collected in BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 579n (1936).
452 Legg v. Evans, 6 M. & W. 36, 151 Eng. Rep. 311 (1840).
446
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to assign the lien with his claim against the bailor.453 The interest of a
hirer under a hire-purchase contract is assignable,4 54 as is that of a purchaser under a conditional sale contract. 455 Assignments and sub-charters are common in connection with the demise of ships.456 Normally
the bailee under a fixed-term bailment or bailment lease may transfer
his interest.457
The theory of the cases holding the interest of the bailee under
some types of bailment alienable is that, in those situations, the element of personal trust is not so prominent as in the ordinary bailment
relationship. Even in such situations the terms of the bailment may
indicate that personal trust is intended. Hence, the text-writers assert
that the terms of a bailment under which the bailee's interest would
otherwise be alienable may validly restrain alienation by providing that
alienation by the bailee will terminate the bailment and entitle the
bailor to immediate possession.458 This is closely analogous to a provision for forfeiture on alienation in a lease of land for life or years,
inserted for the protection of the reversioner. It would seem, therefore,
that the law of restraints on alienation of the bailee's interest in a chattel
453 Gardner v. Le Fevre, 180 Mich. 219, 146 N.W. 653 (1914). Other cases are
collected in BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 534n (1936).
454 Whiteley, Ltd. v. Hilt, [1918] 2 K.B. 808 (C.A.). This is asswned by the HirePurchase Act, 1 & 2 Geo. VI, c. 53, §21 (1938).
455 The cases are collected in 1 WILLISTON, SAL.BS §332n (1924). HoAR, CoNDI·
noNAL SALES 59, 345 (1937). As to the right of possession of a chattel mortgagor, see
Cadwell v. Pray, 41 Mich. 307, 2 N.W. 52 (1879); Daggett, Bassett & Hills Co. v. McClintock, 56 Mich. 51, 22 N.W. 105 (1885). In Michigan, however, it is dangerous for a
chattel mortgagor or conditional sale contract vendee to assign his interest. Act 328, P.A.
1931, §175, Mich. Stat. Ann. §28.374, Comp. Laws (1948) §750.177, provides: "Any
person who shall . • • dispose of any personal property held by him subject to any chattel
mortgage or written instrument intended to operate as a chattel mortgage, or any lease or
written instrument intended to operate as a lease, or any contract to purchase not yet
fulfilled with intent to injure or defraud the mortgagee, lessor or vendor under such contract
or any assignee thereof, shall • . • be guilty of a felony." It has been held under this
statute that mere proof of a sale raises a presumption of intent to defraud. Bowen v. Borland,
257 Mich. 306, 241 N.W. 201 (1932). As the word "injure" might mean mere inconvenience, the lessee or conditional vendee of chattels asswnes a serious risk in transferring
his interest.
456 E.g., Rutherford, Sender & Co. v. Goldthorpe, Scott & Wright, Ltd., [1922] 1
K.B.,508.
457 Dean v. Whittaker, 1 Car. & P. 347, 171 Eng. Rep. 1225 (1824); Duffell v.
Spottiswoode, 3 Car. & P. 435, 172 Eng. Rep. 490 (1828); GonnAllD, OunINEs OF THE
LA.w OF BAILMI!NTS AND CARRIERS, 2d ed., §120 (1928); STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON THE
LA.w OF BAILMI!NTS, 9th ed., §§324, 413n (1878); see Legg v. Evans, 6 M. & W. 36, 151
Eng. Rep. 311 (1840); Donald v. Suckling, L.R. 1 Q.B. 585 (1866).
4581 HALsBURY, LAws oF ENGLAND 555 (1907); PEREIRA, LAw oF HmE AND HmEPURCHASE 120 (1939); BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 579n (1936). The Hire-Purchase
Act, 1 & 2 Geo. VI, c. 53, §7 (1938) and the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, §13, asswne
the validity of such provisions. See Whitney v. McCoi;mell, 29 Mich. 12 (1874).
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is in general accord with the law as to restraints on estates in land of
like duration. Unlike the case of land, however, it is probable that the
provision for forfeiture must be in favor of the bailor; the bailee's interest probably cannot be made to shift to a third party on alienation.
Commercial sales in the early Middle Ages were normally direct
transactions between producer and consumer. The farmer brought his
produce to market and sold to the town housewife. The artisan sold
his manufactures in his own shop or the local market to purchasers
who bought for personal use. In this setting the Mediaeval Church
developed its doctrine of just price, which applied to both prices and
wages. Under this doctrine the just price was, in general, the actual
cost of production plus an amount sufficient to enable the producer to
maintain himself and his family in the customary manner of persons of
his status; the just wage was an amount sufficient to enable the laborer
to maintain himself and his family according to his status. The just
price did not fluctuate with supply and demand. For the seller to raise
prices because of scarcity was to make an unearned and immoral profit.
For the buyer to seek a lower price because of a glut on the market was
to take an unfair advantage of the producer. For the laborer to ask
higher wages because of a shortage of labor or because the product of his
labor was more valuable than that of other persons of like status was
wrongful. Thus the doctrine tended to condemn competition and all
profits and wages which were more than the amount necessary for the
subsistence of the producer or laborer according to the fixed customs
of his social status.459
The theory of this early period had no place for the trader, the person who purchased goods for resale, whether wholesaler or retailer.
With the growth of towns and the expansion of foreign commerce in
the later Middle Ages, however, the necessity and value of the labor of
those who provided transportation and storage of goods received grudging ecclesiastical recognition. Trade was still regarded as fraught with
temptation to sin, however, and the wholesaler was looked upon with
particular suspicion. Resale by traders was governed by the doctrine of
just price. The resale price should be the cost price plus the actual
cost of transportation, storage, or labor performed in improving the
459 CUNNINGHAM, GnoWTH oF ENGLISH hmusTRY AND CoMMERCE DURING

nm

E,uu,y AND MmDLB AGES, 6th ed., 461 (1915); O'BRIEN, AN EssAY ON MEDIAEVAL EcoNOMIC TEACHING 102-106, 109-123 (1920). Dr. O'Brien suggests that, in some circum-

stances, elements other than the cost of production and the labor of the producer might enter
into the computation of the just price but these two elements were dominant in the process,
pp. 112-120. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND nm RisE oF CAPITALISM, 1950 ed., 27-28, 35, 38.
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goods, plus an amount sufficient to enable the trader to maintain himself and his family in the manner customary to persons of his status.
Speculative trading, purchasing with a view to deriving profit from an
advance in the market price, was improper in all circumstances.460
Corollary to the doctrine of just price was a doctrine that the parties
to sales, because of ignorance and the temptation to seek an unjust
profit, were ordinarily unfit fix the just price with accuracy. Hence
prices, wages, the quality of goods and the details of commerce should
be prescribed by public authority and enforced by governmental agencies.461
Mediaeval English law reflects the doctrine of just price and its
corollary. From Norman to Tudor times prices, wages, quality of goods,
the training of artisans, and the most minute details of commercial activity were strictly regulated to eliminate competition, "unjust" prices
and unearned profits. Some of this regulation was done by the central
government directly, through statutes, orders in council and royal proclamations. Most of it was delegated to chartered companies, boroughs
and markets, which exercised their powers under the supervision of the
central government. Competition was eliminated in many fields by
the grant of monopolies to individuals or chartered companies.462 Evasion of local regulations and speculation in commodities were forbidden
by drastic provisions of the criminal law which denounced as "forestalling" purchasing or contracting to purchase merchandise en route
to any city, port, market or fair from inland or overseas, and attempts to
raise the prices or encourage the withholding from sale of such merchandise.463 This operated to confine trading to areas where regulation
could be effective.
The Reformation weakened the influence of the Roman Catholic
doctrine of just price but it did not result in any relaxation of government controls of·commerce. Instead they became more extensive and
better enforced. In the Tudor, Stuart and Hanoverian periods the
motive of regulation ceased to be the enforcement of just prices and the

to

460 O'BRIEN, AN EssAY ON MEDIAEVAL EcoNoMic TEACinNG 144-151, 152-155
(1920). It should be noted that, as an aspect of the prohibition of usury, the price in a
credit sale
not allowed to be larger than in a cash transaction and, of course, the seller
might not charge interest on the unpaid balance. Id. at 119. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE
R:rsE OF CAPITALISM, 1950 ed., 37-38.
461 O'BRIEN, AN EssAY ON MEDIAEVAL EcoNoMic TEACHING 106-109 (1920);
TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RisE oF CAPITALISM, 1950 ed., 41-42.
4624 HOLDSWORTH, HrsTORY OF ENGLISH LA.w 314-387 (1924).
463 Stat. 51 Hen. III, stat. 6, c. 3, §5 (1266); 25 Edw. III, stat. 4, c. 3 (1350); confirmed by 2 Ric. II, stat. 1, c. 2 (1378); explained by 5 & 6 Edw. VI, c. 14, §1 1552. The

was
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elimination of unjust profits and became that of the mercantile system,
the enhancement of the power, prestige and wealth of the national state
in peace and war. The new regulation permitted large profits when
they served to encourage the growth of industries deemed desirable. It
did not, however, tolerate profiteering in food. 464 By a statute of Henry
VIII the central government assumed direct control of the regulation
of food prices.465 A statute of Edward VI restated the old criminal law
of forestalling and prohibited "regrating," reselling of foodstuffs purchased in a fair or market, in a fair or market held at the same place or
within four miles thereof, and "ingrossing," which the statute declared
was committed when any person or persons,
"get into his or their hands, by buying, contracting or promisetaking, other than by demise, grant, or lease of land or tithe, any
com growing in the fields, or any other com or grain, butter,
cheese, fish, or other dead victuals whatsoever, within the realm of
England, to the intent to sell the same again." 466
Sir Edward Coke thought that the quoted language was only designed to prohibit resale in gross and did not prevent purchase of foodstuffs for resale at retail467 but the broad language of the statute appears
to condemn the whole business of trading in groceries, wholesale and
retail alike. In 1620 a grocer was prosecuted for buying twenty quarters of wheat, making it into starch, and selling the starch to several persons. The Court of King's Bench held that this was not a violation of
statute of 51 Hen. ill forbade purchase at a market before it opened. This suggests the
primary purpose of these penal statutes: to confine trading to public markets where it could
be regulated effectively. The mediaeval authorities were trying to eliminate "under the
counter" sales. There were other statutes on the subject. Herbruck, ''Forestalling, Regrating and Engrossing," 27 M:rCH. L. REv. 365-376 (1929).
'
464 Note 462 supra; CUNNINGHAM, GROWTH OP ENGLISH hmusTRY AND CoMMI!ROB
DtnUNG THB EARLY AND MIDDLE AGES, 6th ed., 470-472, 481-483 (1915); TAWNEY, RE·
. LIGION AND THB RrsE OP CAPrrALisM, 1950 ed., cc. II, ill, IV.
465 Stat. 25 Hen. 8, c. 2 (1533). This act did not abolish local price regulation but
authorized price-fixing by the Council when local regulation was inadequate. For the
operation of the price and wage regulation systems under Elizabeth, see CUNNINGHAM,
GROWTH OP ENGLISH hmusTRY AND COMMERCE IN MoDERN TIMES, 6th ed., 25-36, 85-99
(1919).
466 Stat. 5 & 6 Edw. VI, c. 14, §§2, 3 (1552).
467 3 INSTITUTES, *195-196. The first statutory use of the term "ingross" seems to
have been in 37 Edw. ill, c. 5 (1363), which complains "that the merchants, called grocers,
do ingross all manner of merchandise vendible: and suddenly do enhance the price of such
merchandise within the realm, putting to sale by covin and ordinance made betwixt them,
called the fraternity and gild of merchants, the merchandises, which be most dear, and
keep in store the other, till the time that dearth or scarcity be of the same. • • ." This
suggests that the offense was hoarding with a view to making an unjust profit on resale;
not the mere business of engaging in the wholesale or retail grocery trade.
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the statute, which tends to confirm Coke's view. 468 However, prosecutions under the statute were begun against ordinary retailers of butter
and cheese who sold in the normal course of business.469 A statute of
1623 declares that the statute of Edward VI made "no proviso" for
retailers, that they have been troubled by prosecutions under it, and
provides that it shall not prevent licensed cheese-mongers from retailing butter and cheese in London. 470
After the Restoration the central government ceased to enforce or
supervise the enforcement of regulations governing prices, wages and
the quality of goods. Local regulatory bodies tended to relax or break
down entirely. There was little to prevent speculators making large
profits through resale of commodities except the occasional activities
of informers who brought qui tam actions for penalties under the old
statutes.471 The statute of Edward VI was repealed in 1772472 but
as late as 1800 a person was convicted of ingrossing by buying a fifth
of the hops on sale at Worcester Market with a view to resale when the
price went up. 473 The court held that the repeal of the statute did not
abolish the common law crime of ingrossing and rejected the contention
of the defendant's counsel that there could not be a conviction without
proof of intent to resell in gross, that is, wholesale.
468 Davison v. Culier, J. Bridg. 5, 123 Eng. Rep. II60 (1620). Similar decisions are
collected in Herbruck, "Forestalling, Regrating and Engrossing," 27 MlcH. L. REv. 365 at
378n (1929).
469 E.g. Bedoe v. Alpe, W. Jones 156, 82 Eng. Rep. 83 (1622). The vague language
of the statute worked a serious hardship on legitimate merchants because the mode of
enforcement was by qui tam actions brought by mercenary informers. It was probably
cheaper to buy off these informers than to defend even groundless prosecutions.
470 Stat. 21 Jae. I, c. 22 (1623). This statute also frees London retailers from the
inhibitions of Stat. 3 & 4 Edw. VI, c. 21 (1549) which explicitly forbade wholesale dealing
in butter and cheese and restricted retail sales to quantities not in excess of a waye of
cheese or a barrel of butter.
471 CUNNINGHAM, GROWTH OF ENGLISH hrousTRY AND COMMERCE IN MoDBRN
TIMES, 6th ed., 202-206 (1919).
472Stat. 12 Geo. III, c. 71 (1772). This also repealed Stat. 3 & 4 Edw. VI, c. 21
(1549), note 470 supra.
473The King v. Waddington, l East 143, 102 Eng. Rep. 56 (1800). Lord Kenyon's
opinion states that he had read Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations to inform himself on
the economic problems involved but was not convinced of the advantages of unregulated
trade. l East 157, 102 Eng. Rep. 62. Senator Benjamin thought that the crime was committed only when the purchase was of large quantities [TRBATISB ON TIIB LAW OF SALB
OF PmtsoNAL PROPERTY, 7th ed., 530 (1931)] but the butter and cheese cases throw some
doubt on this. The opinions in The King v. Waddington do indicate, however, that the
evil of the offense lay in the tendency to enhance prices. Compare 3 CoKB, lNsTITUT.Ss,
"195-196. This definition of the evil accords with the language of a statute of Henry ill
or Edward I. l Stat. of the Realm, 203-204; Herbruck, "Forestalling, Regrating and Engrossing,'' 27 MicH. L. REv. 365 at 374-375 (1929). Theoretically market manipulations
could not enhance prices fixed by law but mediaeval regulators, like modern ones, had
troubles with the ''black market."
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The writings of the Physiocratic School in France and of the English economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo effected a profound
change in the general attitude toward commerce and resulted by 1846
in a revolution in British policy. The new view was that prosperity
could best be served by removing all restrictions from industry and trade,
by allowing prices and wages to be :6.xed by supply and demand, by the
enlightened self-interest of the individuals concerned in free and unregulated competition. Under it, competition was seen as a public good
instead of an evil to be suppressed by elaborate regulation. The old
statutes :6.xing wages and prices, regulating the quality of goods, limiting by licensing the persons who could engage in trades, and prohibiting
unjust profits, were repealed. The crimes of forestalling, regrating and
ingrossing were abolished/74 The era of laissez faire had begun; for
the first time individuals were free to fix prices, wages and the terms
of commercial transactions by private contract, subject only to newly
developed doctrines that contracts must not be in restraint of trade.
The term "restraint of trade" was not new but it acquired a wholly
new meaning. Cases decided as early as the fifteenth century had
declared that all contracts in restraint of trade were contrary to public
policy and void. 475 But those cases were decided in an era when wages,
prices, quality of goods, the right to engage in trade, and the terms of
commercial transactions were governed by minute regulations. These
regulations left virtually no sphere of operation for private commercial
contracts; such a contract was in "restraint of trade" if it attempted to
vary the applicable regulations. It was void for the same reason that
private contracts purporting to fix prices or rents higher than those set
by the American war time price and rent control regulations were void.
The whole mediaeval system was designed to prevent competition;
hence a contract designed to foster competition was void. Under the
new system of laissez faire, free competition was looked upon as an im474 Stats. 3 Geo. IV, c. 41 (1822); 5 Geo. IV, c. 66 (1824); 5 Geo. IV, c. 95 (1824);
7 & 8 Viet., c. 24 (1844). The list of statutes repealed by the last act gives some indication of the elaborateness of the mediaeval and mercantile systems of regulation. See
Herbruck, "Forestalling, Regrating and Engrossing," 27 MicH. L. RBv. 365 (1929).
475Dyer's Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. V, Pasch., pl. 26 (1415); Colgate v. Bachelor, Cro. Eliz.
872, 78 Eng. Rep. 1097 (1601); Ipswich Tailors' Case, 11 Co. Rep. 53a, 77 Eng. Rep.
1218 (1614). In a period when the Crown was granting patents of absolute monopoly of
the manufacture and sale of common commodities to court favorites who were not businessmen at all, for the sole purpose of permitting the patentees to make enormous profits out of
licensing such manufacture and sale, the word "monopoly" also had a meaning quite
different from the current use of the term. See The Case of Monopolies, 11 Co. Rep. 84b,
77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (1602); 4 HOLDSWORTH, HisTORY OP ENGLISH LAW 349-353 (1924);
FoRMoY, HisToRICAL FoUNDATioNs OP MoDBRN CoMPANY LAw 11-16 (1923).
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portant object of public policy. In its new sense, "restraint of trade"
means restraint of competition. This radical change in the meaning of
the term must be borne in mind in the use of old authorities on the subject. Moreover, the old cases involved contracts by skilled artisans
not to engage in their trades. In an era when the right to engage in a
skilled trade involved seven years' apprenticeship and membership in
a local guild, enforcement of such a contract meant a change of status
for the artisan. In the mediaeval view everyone was born to his
status and the policy of the law was to keep him in it. The doctrine of
just price, allowing the producer exactly enough profit to enable him
to maintain his status, tended toward this end by preventing the seller
of goods from rising above or falling below his fixed status. In this
view, a contract in "restraint of trade" was objectionable because it was
an attempt to change hereditary status by contract. It is strange that
nineteenth century judges who admired the heroes of Horatio Alger
should have applied precedents based on such principles to invalidate
contracts regulating resale of goods.
The reign of laissez faire in England lasted for about a century, the
period between the end of the Napoleonic wars and the beginning of
World War I and the longest period during which Europe has been free
of general wars. Since then there has been increasing governmental regulation of wages, prices and the terms of commercial transactions. The
current tendency is toward government ownership of industry. Freedom of private contract in commercial transactions had a brief existence
and it is not surprising that the law governing the extent to which restr_aints may be placed on resale of chattels by that means has not
attained complete development. It has attained some development and
that development merits examination.
The growth of the practices of marketing commodities under brand
names and of advertising the merits of these products in media of wide
circulation creates in the manufacturer of such a product a strong economic interest in controlling its resale for the protection of the good
will achieved by the brand name. To ensure that his product is effectively marketed throughout the country he is likely to wish to allot
areas for resale to wholesalers and retailers. He has an interest in seeing that the public everywhere can depend upon his product being
marketed in quantities and quality which are uniform and consistent
with his advertising. He has ari interest in controlling resale prices
both to enhance the effectiveness of his advertising and to prevent
seriously adverse effects on his whole scheme of distribution. If one
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druggist in a community sells Dr. Galen's Kidney Pills at a price below
wholesale cost with a view to inducing customers to come to his store
and buy other goods, the other druggists in the community cannot
afford to sell them at all and will persuade their customers to buy a
substitute, with the result, in the long run, that much of the value of
the manufacturer's advertising is lost. The manufacturer may, of
course, control all this by retailing his own product but this is scarcely
feasible for the manufacturer of a single drug or a few types of canned
foods. Hence the manufacturer has an interest in binding wholesalers
and retailers of his product to abide by the conditions he imposes upon
resale.
English manufacturers have placed chief reliance, in their efforts
to control the prices and conditions of resale of their products, on trade
associations comprising all or virtually all the manufacturers and wholesalers in a given :6.eld. The Tobacco Trade Association, the Proprietary
Articles Trade Association (drugs), and the Motor Trade Association
are examples. The rules of these associations prohibit wholesalers from
selling to retailers who have not agreed to sell only at prices :6.xed by the
manufacturers and approved by the association. If a retailer sells in
violation of the restrictions imposed upon him his name is placed on a
"stop list" and no wholesaler will sell him anything. 476 Thus if a druggist attempts to sell Dr. Galen's Kidney Pills at a cut price, he will be
unable to buy any drugs at all from any British wholesaler. The British
courts have upheld the lawfulness of these associations and their "stoplist" device.477
The trade association device is not always available and effective.
The manufacturer may wish to seek enforcement in the courts of direct
contracts with retailers regulating resale prices and of contracts binding
wholesalers to sell only to retailers who agree to maintain the prices
prescribed by the manufacturer. The British courts are willing to enforce both types of contract speci:6.cally by injunction against the contracting parties. 478 There are suggestions in the opinions that such a
476 Dnr, LAW RELATIVE TO COMPETITIVE TRADING 83-109 (1938); REPORT 01' THE
COMMITTEE ON RESALE PmcB MA:rNTBNANCB (Cmd. 7696, 1949). The committee recommended that these practices be made illegal.
477 Thome v. Motor Trade Association, [1937] A.C. 797. Combinations which restrict
competition against the public interest may, in some cases, be prohibited or regulated by
administrative bodies under the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act, 1948, II & 12 Geo. VI, c. 66.
478 Elliman, Sons & Co. v. Carrington and Son, Ltd., [1901] 2 Ch. 275; Palmolive
Co., Ltd. v. Freedman, [1928] Ch. 264 (C.A.). Enforcement will be denied if the contract
is clearly unreasonable as between the parties. Joseph Evans & Co. v. Heathcote, [1918]
l K.B. 418.
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contract might be illegal if calculated to produce a pernicious monopoly
but none seems to have been held invalid on that ground. 479
Sometimes a retailer who is not a party to a price maintenance contract secures a stock of brand-name goods by deceiving a wholesaler or
retailer who is a party to such a contract or through mistake or deliberate breach of contract on the part of such a party. Such a retailer might
conceivably, under some circumstances, be liable to the manufacturer
in tort for inducing breach of contract. 480 Manufacturers have sought
to bind him by their price regulations on the theory that an equitable
restriction was imposed on the goods, either by the contract with the
wholesaler or through notice attached to the goods. The equitable
restriction on use of land was developed in the nineteenth century by
extension of the rules of covenants running with the land and has been
buttressed by analogies to conditions subsequent and easements.481 Easements and transfers on condition subsequent are unknown in the law
of chattels. Dictum in a sixteenth century case denied that covenants
could run with the ti~le to chattels as they may with the title to land. 482
In consequence, the English courts have held that ordinary chattels
cannot be subjected to equitable use restrictions. 483 Hence price maintenance schemes are not enforceable by judicial means against dealers
who are not parties to contracts binding them to observe the scheme.
The British courts make an exception in the case of patented articles,
holding that the patent entitles the patentee to impose restrictions on
their resale which run with the goods and bind every taker with
notice.484
The law of commercial dealing in chattels is complicated in the
United States by the fact that the Federal Constitution empowers Con479 Attorney-General v. Adelaide Steamship Co., [1913] A.C. 781, 795.
480 Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853).
481 Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Ph. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848); CLAnx, REAL CovENANTs
AND OnmR INn!RESTS WlllCH "RUN WITH LAND" 149-157 (1929); ELPBINSTONE, COVE-

NANTS AFFECTING LAND 69-76 (1946); JoLLY, REsTRicnVE CovENANTs AFFECTING
LAND, 2d ed., 1-18 (1931).
482 Spencer's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 16a, 16b-17a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72, 74 (1583). There is
another difficulty: equitable restrictions on the use of land must be appurtenant to an estate
in the same or neighboring land. Milbourn v. Lyons, [1914] 2 Ch. 231 (C.A.); London
County Council v. Allen, [1914] 3 K.B. 642 (C.A.); Torbay Hotel Co. v. Jenkins, [1927]
2 Ch. 225.
483 Taddy v. Sterious, [1904] 1 Ch. 354; McGruther v. Pitcher, [1904] 2 Ch. 306
(C.A.); Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co., Ltd. v. Selfridge & Co., Ltd., [1915] A.C. 847;
Chafee, "Equitable Servitudes on Chattels," 41 HAB.v. L. REv. 945-1013 (1928). Some
contrary decisions in this country are discussed in Waite, "Public Policy and Personal
Opinion," 19 MicH. L. REv. 265-282 (1921).
484 National Phonograph Co. v. Menck, [1911] A.C. 336.
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gress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes but leaves the regulation of other
commerce to the states.485 Nineteenth century federal policy favored,
in general, freedom of contract and freedom of competition in domestic
commerce. A feeling that freedom of contract was being used to hamper
free competition to an undesirable extent led to the enactment in 1890
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, which provided, "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is hereby declared to be illegal."486
It has been suggested that the generality of the language of this act
made it forbid the normal transactions of business, that, "Business men
now enjoy liberty only according as the prosecuting authorities indulge
them in the open breach of the law." 487 In this respect the act resembles
the statute of Edward VI against ingrossing which, if read literally,
forbade all trade in foodstuffs. 488 The interpretation of the statute in
the federal courts tends to justify this criticism. The earlier federal decisions, both before and after the statute, affirmed the validity of resale
price maintenance contracts and suggested that our law would follow
the British.489 Then, beginning in 1907, a series of decisions of the
Supreme Court and the circuit courts of appeals completely reversed
the rules, holding, in effect, that schemes for retail price maintenance by
contract or equitable restriction are illegal at common law and under the
statute and seriously curtailing even the manufacturer's right to refuse
to sell to dealers who habitually cut prices.490
The Miller-Tydings Amendment of 1937491 inserted a proviso in
the Sherman Act to the effect that contracts permitted by state law pre485 Art.

I, §VIII, cl. 3; Amendment X.
1890, §1, 26 Stat. L. 209, 15 U.S.C. (1946) I.
''Business Enterprise and the Law," 193 N. AM. RBv. 694 at 704

486 Act July 2,
487 Montague,

(1910).
488 Stat.

5 & 6 Edw. VI, c. 14, §3 (1552); notes 466-470, 472 supra.
cases are collected in SELIGMAN AND LoVE, Pru:cE GcnTING AND PRICE MAINTENANCE 43-52 (1932).
400 E.g., John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, (6th Cir. 1907) 153 F. 24; Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 31 S.Ct. 376 (1911); United
States v. Schrader's Son, 252 U.S. 85, 40 S.Ct. 251 (1920). Other cases are collected in
SELIGMAN AND LoVE, PRICE CtnTING AND PRicE MAINTENANCE 52-82 (1932). This line
of cases is effectively criticized in Waite, "Public Policy and Personal Opinion," 19 MICH.
L. R:Ev. 265-282 (1921). This is not the place for an extended discussion of the intricacies
of interpretation of the federal anti-trust laws and related statutes. As to the special problem
created by patent monopolies, see United States v. New Wrinkle, 342 U.S. 371, 72 S.Ct.
350 (1952).
401 Act Aug. 17, 1937, tit. VIII, 50 Stat. L. 693, 15 U.S.C. I.
489 The
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scribing minimum prices for products sold under trade mark or brand
name should not be illegal by reason of that act or the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 492 The proviso does not permit contracts between
producers, between wholesalers, between retailers, or between others
in competition with each other; that is, it limits them to contracts between a producer and his distributors or between a wholesaler and his
retail outlets. By the end of 1936, 14 states had enacted statutes, commonly called "fair trade" laws493 authorizing resale price maintenance
contracts as to trade-marked and brand-named goods. In 1937, 28 more
states enacted such statutes and by 1950, 45 states had such legislation
in force. 494 State statutes enacted in 1933 and thereafter contained a
"non-signer" provision to the effect that whenever a producer has
entered into a price-maintenance contract, price-cutting by anyone,
whether or not a party to the contract, is actionable. The Supreme
Court had held in 1936 that such a provision was valid, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, as to transactions in intrastate commerce. 495
It decided in 1951, however, that the Miller-Tydings Amendment does
not permit the enforcement of such a "non-signer" provision as to transactions in interstate or foreign commerce.496
A Michigan statute enacted in 1899 makes illegal and unenforceable contracts :fixing resale prices in terms so broad as to make it questionable whether even an agreement between partners as to the prices
at which their :firm will sell is not illegal.497 This statute, like the
492Act Sept. 26, 1914, 38 Stat. L. 717, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 41, et seq.
493 It is of interest to note that seventeenth century smugglers who violated the trade
regulations imposed under the mercantile system referred to their operations as "fair trade."
ScoTr, GUY MANNllRING, c. 4.
494 Dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J., in Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 at 398, 71 S.Ct. 745 (1951). See GRETHER, PRICE CoNTRoL
UNDER FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION (1939).
495 Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 57 S.Ct.
139 (1936).
496 Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 71 S.Ct. 745
(1951). H.R. 5767 and H.R. 6925, 82d Cong., now pending, would further amend the
Sherman Act to eliminate the rule of this case.
497 "Sec. 1. That a trust is a combination of capital, skill or arts by two or more
persons, firms, partnerships, corporations or associations of persons, or of any two or more
of them, for either, any or all of the following purposes: •
"I. To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce;
"2. To limit or reduce the production, or increase or reduce the price of, merchandise
or any commodity;
"3. To prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transportation, sale or purchase of merchandise, produce or any commodity;
"4. To fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public or consumer shall
be in any manner controlled or established, any article or commodity of merchandise,
produce or commerce intended for sale, barter, use or consumption in this State;
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Sherman Anti-Trust Act498 and the statute of Edward Vl, 499 if literally
interpreted, would forbid virtually all trade. Like them it is an example
of a type of legislation which is an invitation to tyranny, branding legitimate businessmen as criminals and subjecting them to the caprice of
prosecuting officials. There are mischievous types of monopoly which
ought to be criminal. It is unfortunate that our legislatures have been
unwilling to undertake the difficult task of defining them with precision
so that traders who wish to abide by the law might be able to determine
what activities are permitted and what are not.

Hunt v. Riverside Co-operative Club 500 was a proceeding to restrain
violation of the act of 1899. The defendant was an association com. prising all seven of the plumbing supply dealers and 131 of 168 master
plumbers in the City of Detroit. Its rules provided that the wholesalers would sell only to master plumbers at prices fixed by a committee
of the association, the prices to master plumbers who were not members
to be 15% to 30% higher than those charged members. An injunction
against enforcement of these rules was granted, the court saying that
such a price-fixing arrangement, designed to create a monopoly, was
illegal at common law. Unquestionably the arrangement violated the
"5. It shall hereafter be unlawful for two or more persons, fums, partnerships, corporations or associations of persons, or of any two or more of them, to make or enter into
or execute or carry out any contracts, obligations or agreements of any kind or description,
by which they shall bind or have bound themselves not to sell, dispose of or transport any
article or any commodity or any article of trade, use, merchandise, commerce or consumption below a common standard figure or fixed value, or by which they shall agree in any
manner to keep the price of such article, commodity or transportation at a fixed or graduated figure, or by which they shall in any manner establish or settle the price of any
article, commodity or transportation between them or themselves and others, so as to directly
or indirectly preclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchasers or consumers, in the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity, or by
which they shall agree to pool, combine or directly or indirectly unite any interests that
they may have connected with the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity,
that its price might in any manner be affected. Every such trust as is defined herein is
declared to be unlawful, against public policy and void. • • •
"Sec. 8. That any contract or agreement in violation of the provisions of this act shall
be absolutely void and not enforceable either in law or equity."-Act 255, P.A. 1899,
Comp. Laws (1915) §§15013, 15020; Comp. Laws (1929) §§16647, 16654; Mich. Stat.
Ann. §§28.31, 28.36; Comp. Laws (1948) §§445.701, 445.708. Sec. l was amended by
Act 60, P.A. 1925, to exempt farm and dairy cooperatives. Act 229, P.A. 1905, Comp.
Laws (1915) §§15027 to 15032; Comp. Laws (1929) §§16661 to 16666; Mich. Stat. Ann.
§§28.51 to 28.55; Comp. Laws (1948) §§445.761 to 445.767 supplemented the Act of 1899
by prohibiting contracts requiring dealers to handle only one make of machinery, tools,
implements, vehicles or appliances designed for use in productive industry.
498 Note
499 Stat.

486 supra.
5 & 6 Edw. VI, c. 14, §3 (1552); notes 466, 470, 472 supra.
lioo 140 Mich. 538, 104 N.W. 40 (1905).
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act of 1899 so there can be no proper criticism of the result reached. If
by "common law" is meant the English law in 1607, however, it will
be recalled that such price-fixing by local guilds was looked upon as
the normal and proper method of determining just prices.

W. H. Hill Co. v. Gray & Worcester5° 1 was a suit by a drug manufacturer against a retailer to restrain price-cutting. The plaintiff manufactured Hill's Cascara Bromide Quinine and marketed it through
wholesalers who contracted not to resell to retailers disapproved by the
plaintiff. In order to secure approval, retailers were required to contract with the plaintiff not to sell at less than the price marked on each
package of the drug. The defendant entered into such a contract in
March 1906 and complied with it until December 1907, when it was ·
rescinded by mutual consent. Soon after, the defendant secured a supply of Hill's Cascara Bromide Quinine from a wholesaler, who did not
know of the rescission of the contract, and began retailing the product
at a cut price. A decree dismissing the bill of complaint was affirmed.
The court held that the plaintiff's system of retail price maintenance
was illegal, both under the statute and at common law, relying entirely
upon the federal decisions in John D. Parks & Sons Co. v. Hartman502
and Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co.503 and quoting the following from Judge Lurton's opinion in the Hartman case:
"'A prime objection to the enforceability to [sic] such a system
of restraint upon sales and prices is that they offend against the
ordinary and usual freedom of traffic in chattels or articles which
pass by mere delivery. The right of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right of general property in moveables, and restraints upon alienation have been generally regarded as obnoxious
to public policy, which is best subserved by great freedom of traffic
in such things as pass from. hand to hand. General restraint in the
alienation of articles, things, chattels, except when a very special
kind of property is involved, such as a slave, or an heirloom, have
been generally held void. "If a man," says Lord Coke, in Coke on
Littleton, §360, "be possessed of a horse or any other chattel real
or personal, and give his whole interest or property therein, upon
condition that the donee or vendee shall not alien the same, the
same is void, because his whole interest and property is out of him
501 163 Mich. 12, 127 N.W. 803 (1910).
502 (6th Cir. 1907) 153 F. 24, note 490 supra.
503 (6th Cir. 1908) 164 F. 803, affd. 220 U.S.

supra.

373, 31 S.Ct. 376 (1911), note 490
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so as he hath no possibility of reverter; and it is against trade and
traffic and bargaining and contracting between man and man."
It is also a general rule of the common law that a contract restricting the use or controlling subsales ~annot be annexed to a chattel,
so as to follow the article and obligate the subpurchaser by operation of notice.' "504
The quotation from Sir Edward Coke suggests that the rule laid
down by these cases proscribes even a single contract restricting resale of
a single chattel under circumstances which involve neither monopoly
nor any effect on general market conditions. The fact that Coke is disqualified as an authority in this field by the vastly different economic
and legal setting in which he wrote has already been suggested. Despite this reliance upon a line of reasoning which would apply to a
single contract as well as to an extensive system designed to establish a
monopoly, the opinions in both the Hartman and Gray and Worcester
cases expressly state that a single contract is not governed by the same
rule of illegality. 505 In their attempt to state the common law in a situation governed by statute, these opinions add confusion to the common
law. It seems unfortunate that the court was not content to rest its
decision in W. H. Hill Co. v. Gray &- Worcester on the Michigan statute of 1899.1506
Mulliken v. Naph-Sol Refining Co. 507 was an action for damages
for breach of contract. The plaintiff, a wholesaler and retailer of gaso163 Mich. 12 at 23-24, 127 N.W. 803, quoting from 153 F. 24 at 39.
153 F. 24 at 37; 163 Mich. 12 at 21, 127 N.W. 803. "A single contract, although
it be such as, taken alone, may not be within the rule at common law against contracts
in restraint of trade, which is one of a great number of identical contracts made between
the producer of an unpatented article of commerce and dealers therein, forming a 'system'
of contracts, which, taken as a whole, materially affects the public interests by stilling
competition and trade in said article, is an unreasonable restraint, and within the rule at
common law against contracts in restraint of trade, if, from an examination of the workings
of the whole system, it appears that the restraint is actually, though not ostensibly, the
main result and object of the system of contracts, and not merely ancillary or incidental
to another and legitimate object." Ibid. One could wish that the common law prohibited
such sentences as that quoted.
506 The opinion concludes with this passage: ''But we place our decision upon the
ground that complainant's system of contracts deals with the manufactured product of its
secret process, and not with the process itself, and that the system of contracts, being a
restraint upon free competition, falls within the common-law prohibition of restraints of
trade, and is void.
"Having reached this conclusion, it is unnecessary to decide whether or not such contracts are illegal and void under the statute of this State." 163 Mich. 12 at 26, 127 N.W.
803.
507 302 Mich. 410, 4 N.W. (2d) 707 (1942). The facts are not made clear in the
opinion but are brought out in the record.
504
505
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line, sent a letter to the defendant, agreeing to buy his gasoline requirements for a year from defendant at one and three quarters cents
per gallon below the retail price set by the defendant for the Grand
Rapids area. It contained no agreement by the plaintiff to abide by the
retail prices so set. The parties dealt on this basis for nine months.
There was dispute as to whether the plaintiff or the defendant refused
to deal. The circuit judge directed a verdict for the defendant on the
ground that, although the plaintiff had promised to buy gasoline, the
defendant had not contracted to sell it. A judgment for the defendant
was affirmed on the sole ground that the contract was illegal because
it provided for the setting of retail prices by the defendant, the court
citing Hunt 11. Riverside Cooperative Cluh508 and the Act of 1899.509
The opinion contains the following language:

"In a reply brief appellant contends that the opening statement
did not disclose a void contract and that the agreement 'was a good
deal like a lease arrangement.' A lease is a contract and would be
void under the statute quoted if it was for a purpose prohibited by
law. So far as we are able to determine from this record, the arrangement between the parties was more nearly that of principal
and agent, and an agency for an illegal purpose is void, just as is
a contract for an illegal purpose."510
This language would seem to condemn as illegal a retail merchant's
prescribing the prices at which his sales clerks are to sell his goods. Such
a construction of the Act of 1899 is certainly possible but one may question whether the legislature really meant to restrain ordinary trade practices to such an extent.

Staehler-Kempf Oil Co. 11. Mac's Auto Mart, Inc.511 was a suit to
restrain the sale of gasoline at prices below those fixed by the plaintiff.
In 1946 the plaintiff conveyed land in Ann Arbor to Martin Sales &
Service Co. in fee simple by a deed containing a covenant by the grantee
that if it built a filling station on the land it would purchase all its
requirements of gasoline, oil and lubricants from the plaintiff and would
retail such products at the prices customarily furnished to other dealers
in the area. The covenant provided that it should run with the land
508 Note 500 supra.
509 Note 497 supra.
510302 Mich. 410 at 413-414, 4 N.W. (2d) 707.
511 329 Mich. 351, 45 N.W. (2d) 316 (1951). Cf Knoop v. Penn Eaton Motor
Oil Co., 331 Mich. 693, 50 N.W. (2d) 329 (1951).
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and be operative for ten years. In 1947 Martin Sales & Service Co.
conveyed the land to the defendant by a deed containing the same covenant. The plaintiff sold 1,600 gallons of gasoline to the defendant
and then requested the defendant to enter into a resale price maintenance contract of the type the plaintiff required of its retail dealers.
The defendant declined. A decree restraining the defendant from
selling at prices below those which the plaintiff prescribed for retailers bound by contract to it was affirmed. Without referring to the
well-settled rule that use restrictions on land must be appurtenant to
neighboring land,512 the court held that the covenant imposed a reasonable and valid use restriction which ran with the land and bound the
defendant. As to the Act of 1899, the court said:
"The statute, if read literally, would seem to support the defendant's contentions. However, the statute does not define restraint of trade, and the definition has been judicially supplied. It
has long been held that a contract would not be construed as in
restraint of trade unless the restraint was unreasonable. . ..
"The cases cited by the appellant are not in point. Hunt 11.
Riverside Co-Operative Club, supra,513 and Mulliken 11. Naph-Sol
Re-fining Co., supra,514 involved agreements which were patently
injurious to the interest of the public. W. H. Hill Co. 11. Gray
& Worcester, supra,515 was decided prior to our Court's interpretation of the act of 1899 in People, ex rel. Attorney General, 11. Detroit Asphalt Paving Co., supra,516 and does not represent the current judicial interpretation of the statute, nor do the facts present
as fair and compelling a business purpose as is present in the instant case.
"In view of our decision there is no need to discuss the effect
of the Michigan fair trade act ... on this covenant." 517
512Note 482 supra; Baxter v. Ogooshevitz, 205 Mich. 249, 171 N.W. 385 (1919).
A condition subsequent against sale of liquor in a conveyance of land in fee, inserted for
the purpose of keeping employees of the grantor's saw mill sober, was enforced in an action
of ejectment in Smith v. Barrie, 56 Mich. 314, 22 N.W. 816 (1885). A similar condition,
inserted for the purpose of protecting the grantor's saloon against competition, was enforced
by injunction in Watrous v. Allen, 57 Mich. 362, 24 N.W. 104 (1885).
513 Note 500 supra.
514 Note 507 supra.
515 Note 501 supra.
516 244 Mich. 119, 221 N.W. 122 (1928). This was a quo warranto proceeding under
the Act of 1899 against a corporation organized by the four principal paving contractors in
Detroit to effect a partial consolidation of their businesses.
511 329 Mich. 351 at 356, 358, 45 N.W. (2d) 316 (1951).
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The Michigan Fair Trade Law of 1937518 provides that contracts
relating to the sale or resale of a commodity bearing the trade-mark,
brand or name of the producer or owner and which is in fair and open
competition with similar commodities produced by others shall not be
deemed in violation of state law because they provide that the buyer
will not resell at less than the price fixed by the seller or that the buyer
will not resell except to persons who agree to maintain resale prices.
The act contains a "non-signer" provision, as follows:
"Sec. 2. Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale
or selling any commodity at less than the price stipulated in any
contract entered into pursuant to the provisions of section I of this
act, whether the person so advertising, offering for sale 'or selling
is or is' not a party to such contract, is unfair competition and is
actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby, and may be
enjoined by a court of competent jurisdiction."

Weco Products Co. 11. Sam's Cut Rate, Inc.519 was a suit under the
act against a non-signer to restrain sale at cut prices. The court held
that the act was constitutional but dissolved an injunction against the
defendant on the grounds that its price-cutting was not wilful and
knowing and that the plaintiff was guilty of inequitable behavior. It
would seem, then, that the fair trade law is valid in toto but that the
"non-signer" clause is unenforceable as to transactions ·in interstate and
foreign commerce because of the Federal Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 520
Except as to transactions governed by the Fair Trade Act, the law
of restraints on resale of chattels is in an unhappily confused state.
The old common law developed in a period when competition was
518 Act 50, P.A. 1937, Mich. Stat. Ann. §§19.321 to 19.324; Comp. Laws (1948)
§§445.151 to 445.154. Act 135, P.A. 1913, Comp. Laws (1915) §§15041 to 15048; Comp.
Laws (1929) §§16683 to 16690; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§28.7.1 to 28.77; Comp. Laws (1948)
§§445.791 to 445.798, prohibits petroleum distributors from making geographical price
discriminations for the purpose of destroying the business of a competitor. This, of course,
was an earlier legislative recognition of the fact that unregulated competition is not always
of public benefit. Such contracts intended to injure or destroy a competitor were prohibited
in the petroleum and bakery trades by Act 282, P.A. 1937, Mich. Stat. Ann. §§28.78(1)
to 28.78(14); Comp. Laws (1948) §§445.171 to 445.184. The latter act also prohibits
sale of petroleum and bakery products below cost with intent to injure or destroy a competitor.
519 296 Mich. 190, 295 N.W. 611 (1941). An injunction against a "non-signer'' was
denied in Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Simon, (D.C. Mich. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 962 on the
ground that the defendant's practice of selling at the price set by the producer, without
adding the state sales tax, was not a violation of the act.
520 Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 71 S.Ct. 745
(1951), note 496 supra.
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looked upon as evil and close public regulation of prices and commercial
transactions was the normal rule. The nineteenth century revolution
in thought and public policy, which exalted free competition and unregulated trade as an important object of society, made it difficult for the
courts to make wise use of the precedents laid down in the old era.
The anti-trust legislation of the tum of the century, which tended to
class all restraints on competition, regardless of size or importance, with
pernicious monopolies, added to the confusion. The recent realization,
partly recognized by statute, that completely unregulated competition
is not always publicly desirable has complicated the situation still further. In the present state of the authorities it would be unwise to attempt to predict the validity of restraints on resale of chattels imposed in
a commercial transaction where no elements of pernicious monopoly are
present. May, for example, an artist who sells a painting to a museum at
a low price in consideration of the vendee's contracting not to resell to a
private collector for ten years, enforce the contract? His object, keeping the painting on public display, could be accomplished by means of
the trust device. Whether the law of restraints on alienation of legal
interests prevents its being accomplished by the device of contract, we
do not know.
Shares in business enterprises, including partnerships, joint stock
companies and corporations, have come to be treated as property for
some purposes. The same may be said as to certain types of contract
rights, notably such evidences of debt as bonds, debentures and notes,
insurance policies and annuity contracts. Indeed, much of the wealth
of the modem community is invested in property of these types. Shares
in partnerships involve not only property interests but mutual agency,·
mutual trust and confidence in business skill, and liability for debts.
Hence their alienability may be and usually is, much restricted.521
Shares in joint-stock companies and corporations involve powers of
management and rights of association; corporations often perform quasigovernmental functions. Both the shareholder and the public have an
interest in ensuring competency and continuity of management, which
is sometimes protected by restraints on alienation of shares.522 Their
52 1 LmnLEY, LAw OF PARTNERSHIP "186-187; "593-594 (ed. 1860); Uniform Partnership Act, Act 72, P.A. 1917, §§24 to 28; Comp. Laws (1929) §§9864 to 9868; Mich.
Stat. Ann. §§20.24 to 20.28; Comp. Laws (1948) §§449.24 to 449.28.
522 Annotation: Validity of restrictions by corporations on alienation or transfer of
corporate stock, 65 A.L.R. 1159-1186 (1930); 138 A.L.R. 647-657 (1942). Our statutes
expressly permit restraints on the alienation of stock in nonprofit corporations, c<>-operative
corporations and partnership associations limited. Act 327, P.A. 1931, §§102, 119; Mich.
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free alienability has been further restricted by statute to protect the
public against the promotion of fraudulent schemes and unsound enterprises.523 The rules as to transferability of bonds and notes have evolved
as parts of the law of contracts and negotiable instruments. Insurance
policies and annuity contracts involve elements which are peculiarly
personal, relating to the character, health and habits of the holders.524
In consequence of their peculiarities, special rules of law, much of it
statutory, governing the transferability of shares in business enterprises
and the mentioned types of intangible property, have developed. These
rules sometimes permit, incident to the creation of the interests or to
commercial transactions involving them, restraints on alienation of types
which would be invalid if applied to ordinary legal interests in land
or chattels. Discussion of the validity of restraints on alienation of these
special types of "property" which arise from or are related to their
peculiar character is beyond the scope of this study.
Stat. Ann. §§21.103, 21.120; Comp. Laws (1948) §§450.102, 450.119; Act 191, P.A.
1877, §4, as amended, How. STAT. §2368; Comp. Laws (1897) §6082; Comp. Laws
(1915) §7953; Comp. Laws (1929) §9912; Mich. Stat. Ann. §20.94; Comp. Laws (1948)
§449.304. The Uniform Stock Transfer Act, Act 106, P.A. 1913, §15, Comp. Laws
(1915) §11934, Comp. Laws (1929) §9534, Mich. Stat. Ann. §19.345; Comp. Laws
(1948) §441.15, appears to recognize such restraints as to stock of profit corporations, but
see Lufkin Rule Co. v. Secretary of State, 163 Mich. 30, 127.N.W. 784 (1910). Compare
Bronson Electric Co. v. Rheubottom, 122 Mich. 608, 81 N.W. 563 (1900); Weiland v.
Hogan, 177 Mich. 626, 143 N.W. 599 (1913); Halsey v. Boomer, 236 Mich. 328, 210
N.W. 209 (1926); Bohnsack v. Detroit Trust Co., 292 Mich. 167, 290 N.W. 367 (1940);
Weber v. Lane, 315 Mich. 678, 24 N.W. (2d) 418 (1946).
523Bubble Act, 6 Geo. I, c. 18, §§18-21 (1720); FoRMOY, HISTORICAL FoUNDATIONS
OF MonBRN CoMPANY LAw 47-88 (1923); DUBOIS, THE ENGLISH BusINBss COMPANY
AFTER THE BUBBLE ACT 1720-1800, 1-12 (1938); LINDLEY, LAw oF PARTNBRsmP *145154 (ed. 1860); Blue Sky Law, Act 220, P.A. 1923, as amended, Comp. Laws (1929)
§§9769 to 9801; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§19.741 to 19.773; Comp. Laws (1948) §§451.101 to
451.133.
524 Grismore, "Effect of a Restriction on Assignment in a Contract,'' 31 MicH. L.RBv.
299-319 (1933).

